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Interfaith Adoption: A Symposium
a religious heritage, a belief that is supported by the "Declaration
of the Rights of the Child", unanimously adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly, November 20, 1959, which states in
paragraph 2, -
The child shall enjoy special protection and shall be given opportunities
and facilities, by law and by other means, to enable him to develop physi-
cally, mentally, morally, spiritually and socially in a healthy and normal
manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity.
(4) The Child's Rights in the Adoptive Process
RABBI W. GUNTHER PLAUT, J.D.P'
Historically speaking, Jews are newcomers to the whole problem
of adoption. It is a rather remarkable fact that despite ample pre-
cedent in other ancient and mediaeval laws the Jewish legal tradition,
which is as extensive and sophisticated as any yet created, is singu-
larly silent on this whole subject. Only recently has there appeared
a treatise which, for the first time, studies the matter comprehensively
from the point of view of traditional Jewish law'.
There were a number of sociological reasons for the absence in
Hebrew literature of a parallel to the Roman adrogatio. For one,
permanent childlessness amongst couples (which creates one side of
the adoptive demand) was rare, because where childlessness in a
couple persisted divorce was encouraged and the two partners would
seek other mates. When a child had no living parents, his relatives
or the community would see to it that he received the proper home
environment so that the children might be raised as if they were the
children of their foster-parents. Thus, there existed in every commu-
nity funds for the proper wedding and dowry of indigent children.
Orphanages in the western sense made only a relatively brief appear-
ance in Jewish life and have today almost entirely disappeared.
With the change of the social structure of Jewish communal life
there has now arisen a keen interest in adoptive procedure and legis-
lation, especially since illegitimacy provides so substantial a part of
the number of children available for adoption. The reasons for the
changed attitude and interest of the Jewish community are two.
One, childlessness no longer results in divorce and re-marriage;
Jewish marriage under such circumstances remains a permanent
*Rabbi Plaut is resident rabbi of the Holy Blossom Temple in Toronto.
He is a graduate of the Universities of Heidelberg and Berlin, and holds a
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covenant which cries out for fulfillment through the presence of a
child.
Two, the presence of illegitimate Jewish children has always
been and still remains, at an insignificant level. Hence, non-Jewish
children are practically the only source for fulfilling the adoptive
demand. Formerly, an exclusively and rigidly oriented Christian
society precluded the adoption of such children by Jews; today in
many countries this has become a possibility, if not a practice, and
it is this matter precisely-that is, cross-line religious adoption-
which is at issue in our present consideration.
Notwithstanding a recent policy decision of the Children's Aid
Society of Metropolitan Toronto, the Ontario Child Welfare Act,
discourages (if it does not prohibit) cross-line religious adoptions,
except where special circumstances prevail which may move the
Courts to dispose otherwise. While the Act is silent on religious
requirements for adoption, it expresses itself, in sections 30 and 31,
on the matter of custody as well as on what constitutes a child's
religious faith.
Since other contributions to this symposium have set forth the
substantive matter of these regulations, they will not be repeated here.
It may be helpful, however, to enter into a brief analysis of the
philosophy which apparently underlies the Act.
It is apparent that first of all it proceeds from an essentially
two-dimensional point of view. That is, it conceives of a society com-
posed primarily of Protestants and Roman Catholics. In section 31,
sub-section 3, the Act deals specifically with Protestants and Roman
Catholics and makes but a glancing reference to people "other than
Protestant or Roman Catholic." While applying to such children
the same basic rule, it nonetheless relaxes the rigidity of the section
and introduces a large measure of judicial latitude by employing the
words "where practical".
It is this two-dimensional view of society which creates the
fundamental problem. It cannot be denied that the Act was motivated
by highly commendable principles which aimed at the protection of
religious denominations and of the rights of children and parents,
but in attempting to do so it falls into a net of other problems. It
makes the state partner to a definition of what constitutes Protestants,
Roman Catholics, and people of other faiths, and, in its specific men-
tion of the two majority faiths, gives preferential treatment to them,
which is not in accordance with the more egalitarian view of society
which has since developed. If children are to be protected, such pro-
tection must extend to all children alike. If the religious faith of chil-
dren is to be protected, the religious faith of all children should be
protected in like manner, and no special reference need or ought to
be made to any specific religious group. To do so, reveals only un-
certainty and thereby constitutes a serious defect in the philosophic
structuring of the legislation.
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This bring us to a related dilemma which is clearly reflected in
the Act. It may be phrased as a question: "How far may the state
proceed with the shaping of a child's religious future, when admittedly
religion is a private matter and, as far as the State is concerned, can
only be of administrative, but not of substantive concern?" On the
whole the Act is fairly successful in this respect, although, as one
would expect, the very confluence of private and public interest
creates contradictions and conflict. Once the law enters into religious
definitions, it is on shaky and difficult ground, for it tries to combine
the uncombinable, and reconciles that which is often by tradition
or religious conviction irreconcilable.
The moment the law becomes specific, it becomes partisan.
An example in point is Section 31, sub-section 1, which states that:
"a child shall be deemed to have the same religious faith as his
father."2 From the Jewish point of view this constitutes an arbitrary
rule and an interference with hallowed and established rights. In
Judaism the child always goes after the mother's religious faith and
background. In a case in which a civilly valid marriage has been con-
tracted between a Christian man and a Jewish woman, the Child
Welfare Act would consider the child of such a union to be presump-
tively Christian, while Jewish tradition would with equal justification
feel that the child is deprived of his legitimate religious heritage.
Needless to say, in such a case the law vitiates by its very specificity
its own intent of granting children their inherent rights.
It is caught on the horns of a dilemma and by its own making
treats citizens differently, maintaining the rights of some and at
the same time depriving others of them. This defect too arises from
the above-mentioned two-dimensional view of society and it com-
pounds the problem by making the law partner to religious definitions.
This defect too must be remedied by taking the legislator as far as
possible out of the business of religion and by making him provide
guiding principles rather than rigid rules.
The Child Welfare Act neatly circumvents the most important
problem of all, namely, the philosophic determination of what con-
stitutes the rights of a child. There is an underlying feeling that the
child's own wishes must be supreme. Section 31, sub-section 5, states
this obliquely, when it notes that the judge "may (italics added)
have regard to the wishes of the child in determining what order
ought to be made as to his religious faith." And in sub-section 5 of
Section 30, it speaks more forcefully of "any right that the child
possesses to exercise his own free choice." 3 The law recognizes, and
I think correctly, that rights adhere primarily to the Verson in ques-
tion, which here means the child.
Is religious faith a "right" in this sense? The law would seem
to agree that it is and various religious traditions would support
2 Sub-section 2 rules differently for an illegitimate child.
3 For the application of discretionary power see In Re Lamb, [1961]
O.W.N. 356.
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this point of view. In Roman Catholicism, for instance, baptism con-
fers upon the child an inalienable status from which the temporal
power has no right to separate him. In Judaism, with its close link-
age of ethnic and religious elements, the incidence of birth (and not,
as is often believed, the act of circumcision) provides a similar if
not unalterable status. Once a child is born to a Jewish mother,
nothing,- neither the state nor baptism, nor even a later free de-
cision of the child himself - can take away this initial unalterable
fact, which is acquired by natural act of birth. This same tradition,
provides also, however, that where a non-Jewish child was adopted
by Jewish parents, was circumcized and would therefore be con-
sidered in every respect like a natural-born Jewish child, such child,
upon reaching maturity, may by his own free will and volition dis-
associate himself from his acquired tradition.
It is proper therefore for the Child Welfare Act to encourage
the protection of such rights. At the same time the Act realizes that
the child's right is limited in a pragmatic fashion, simply because,
during the formative years of his life, he cannot intelligently and
effectively exercise his own will. It is during these formative years,
therefore, that a decision has to be made which likely will become
the decisive factor for a child's life. This decision has to be made
for him, by someone else. -Usually it is made by the child's natural
parents and the Act provides that substitute parents - be they Chil-
dren's Aid Society or the state - may on occasion make this pro-
vision. The right of the child is therefore inherent in the child,
while the right of the parent or the substitute parent is only adminis-
trative.
The law does not make this distinction when in Section 30, sub-
section 4,. it speaks of a parent having "a legal right to require the
child to be brought up ... in that religious faith." It is obvious of
course that in most cases the administrative right of the parent
influences the substantive right of the child. The religious education
to which the child is being exposed in his younger years almost in-
variably determines his future, and the free choice which the law
leaves him is formal rather than real.
Recent discussions have generally attempted to broaden the
concept of the child's rights. They have included in such rights the
presumed right of a child to loving parents, to a proper home, and
to an adequate environment and education. Some have gone so far
as to declare religious rights to be distinctly secondary and subor-
dinate to these other psychological and social prerogatives. There
is some danger here that a positively motivated humanitarianism
becomes so broad and shallow that it becomes meaningless, and that
if wide-spread popular opinion today be reflected in the law, chil-
dren may also be said to be endowed with "rights" to all manner of
material possessions and privilege. It is quite true that religious
affiliation neither is nor can it be the sole determinant of a child's
life, but neither should we yield too quickly to what is commonly
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called a "social work philosophy," while determining the total con-
text of a person's existence.
In our opinion the present Child Welfare Act suffers from three
defects:
(1) Its denominational two-dimensionality must be eliminated.
The Act should be amended to omit any special mention and prefer-
ential treatment of any religious group. Religious as well as non-
religious preferences must be treated in an egalitarian manner as
befits our present day concept of society.
(2) The rigidity of the law, especially as formulated in Section
31, sub-section 3, must be loosened. We should place greater trust
in the discretion of the courts, and not attempt to bind them too
closely in an area where literalness may become self-defeating.
(3) It is contradictory for a parent who gives up a child for
adoption, to give up the person of the child, but retain determination
of the child's spiritual future. The recognition of such a parental
right as a substantive right is an error of the law. Parents have the
pragmatic right of guidance and child-rearing and have during the
child's minority actual powers of direction. But where the child is
given up, such powers cease. The desires of the natural parent may
be serve as a guide and voluntary measure of preference to a Chil-
dren's Aid Society and to the Court, but the law should not make
this compelling. The child's inherent rights are more important
than the natural parent's administrative rights. When determining
the former, the law should take heed of the development of newer
and deepened concepts of what constitutes "a religious environment."
Religion is more than church adherence and affiliation; it constitutes
the total ethical, moral, social as well as the specifically "religious"
context of a family's life. Agnosticism and atheism are not identical
with moral turpitude.
I would recommend therefore a broadening of the definitions
concerning a child's rights, and would further recommend that a
child's religious rights be included, and included prominently, in
a catalogue of such rights. Such a definition should serve as a guiding
principle to the various agencies of the state. It should by its very
nature not attempt to be literally binding. If Jewish parents in
search of an adoptable child will benefit from such a change it will
only be because adoptable children in need of a home will be benefited.
In our society the entrance of the state into the business of de-
termining a child's religious future can no longer be wholly successful.
A revision of the Child Welfare Act should take this into consideration
and should attempt to make whatever regulations it retains in this
respect to be advisory only. I believe that the total fabric of our
society will thereby be strengthened, and that the religious rights of
adoptive children will thereby in no wise be diminished.
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